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The title of this paper is an allusion to Max Fisch’s suggestion of the name Peirce might
have given to his developmental study of Plato’s ethics (Fish 1981: 30). Portions of this
paper have been presented in a couple of forums dedicated to the study of pragmatism
and Peirce’s philosophy; and many people have helped me with their comments. I am
grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments; and especially to
Susan Haack who read and corrected many drafts.
What was it that Pascal said? “La vraie morale se
moque de la morale.”
(C. S. Peirce, 1902)
1 Charles S. Peirce’s first account of ethics was enunciated in the second half of the 1890s,
when he was almost sixty years old;  and it  was quite dismissive (CP 1.50,  1896).1 His
second, positive view of ethics came shortly after (CP 8.158, 1901). The fact that it took
Peirce many years to write about ethics and that he changed his mind in a relatively short
period of time perhaps explains why his moral writings have not been taken seriously.2
This  picture,  however,  has  been  recently  challenged  by  a  group  of  scholars  who
developed a growing interest in Peirce’s normative thinking.3
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  offer  a  distinct  contribution  to  recent  attempts  to
understand Peirce’s normative thinking. I want to trace the growth of Peirce’s thinking
about  ethics  from  dismissing  it  as  a  “useless”  and  “dubious”  kind  of  knowledge  to
reviewing it as a major philosophical concern; and to illustrate my argument I will show
how his conflicting positions appear to correlate with his theory of the categories. While
a  diachronic  approach  will  be  necessary  to  correct  some  efforts  to  resolve  the
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inconsistencies in Peirce’s moral theory,4 a categorical account is essential to perceive its
inner coherence and to support the view that Peirce moved from a nominalist to a realist
position in moral philosophy.
My  argument  is  a  sequel  to  Rosa  Mayorga’s  (2012)  recent  suggestion  that  Peirce’s
dismissive remarks about ethics should not be disregarded as either contradictory or
cynical. Accordingly, Peirce has been of two minds about ethics, and his initial negative
account can be understood in light of his distaste for nominalism. Following Mayorga’s
suggestion will allow me to advance the idea and propose that Peirce has been (as usual)
of three minds, for eventually he came to think that ethics in the last resort appeals to
esthetics.5 However, as I will argue, one would be wrong to conclude that Peirce came to
think of ethics as belonging to the category of Firstness. With the help of Peirce’s diagram
of the degenerate forms of Thirdness, I will attempt to discuss a rather complex, sub-
categorical account of what I shall call the “threefold” normative ideal. I want to suggest
that a comprehensive account of the growth of Peirce’s ethics requires looking not only
at the three universal categories – Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness – but also at the
degenerate forms of these categories; particularly, at the degenerate forms of Thirdness.
The relation between Peirce’s normative thinking and the category of Thirdness in all its
detail has been seldom explored.6
2 I will begin with a brief account of the origin of Peirce’s interest in ethics back in the
1880s, and the reasons that might have led to his radical change of mind (Section 1). I will
then trace the three stages I identify in the growth of his conceptions of ethics, and show
how his different positions appear to correlate with his categories (Section 2). While the
correspondence between Peirce’s notions of “morality” and “Pure Ethics,” on the one
side, and the categories of Secondness and Thirdness, on the other, will become clearer,
finding a place for “esthetics” in his categorical scheme will be a more complicated task.
This difficulty has even led some commentators to propose the inclusion of a Fourth
category. I will explore in the last part of my paper the degenerate forms of Thirdness
(Section 3).
3 Needless to say, an exhaustive description of Peirce’s theory of the categories and its
degenerate sub-divisions, as well as of his evolving conceptions of ethics is not possible
within the scope of a single essay. Still, I hope to show that his thinking about ethics
evolved significantly; and that his final realist position should be understood in light of
the degenerate forms of Thirdness.
 
The Origin of Peirce’s Ethics
4 Looking back during the 1903 Harvard Lectures to the origin of his interest in ethics,
Peirce twice mentioned the year 1883. He told us that at that point in time he began to
read the works of the “great” moralists and the subject of ethics started to make an
impression on him (CP 5.111, 1903). Yet Peirce admitted that in the 1880s he was not
ready to say that ethics was a normative science (CP 5.129, 1903).7
5 What seems to have boosted Peirce’s interest in ethics back in the 1880s was a course he
taught  in  1883-84  at  the  Johns  Hopkins  University,  dedicated  to  the  study  of  the
psychology of great men.8 One of the main purposes was to show that observations devoid
of precision,  such as the greatness of  men,  admit mathematical  treatment.  A further
purpose was to show that feelings “do not, for the most part, differ extravagantly among
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different persons in the same environment” (CP 7.257, 1900). His Study of Great Men (W5:
26-106, 1883-84) included around 300 distinguished and historical people. Interestingly,
Peirce  identified  three  kinds  of  greatness  in  men:  “feeling,” in  musicians,  novelists,
artists,  poets,  writers,  dramatists,  and actors;  “action,” in rulers,  generals,  statesmen,
personalities,  philanthropists,  explorers,  and lawyers;  and “thought,” in philosophers,
mathematicians,  physicists,  moralists,  reformers,  linguists,  religionists,  inventors,
biologists,  and  historians  (W5:  35-8,  1883-84).  These  three  kinds  of  greatness  bear  a
resemblance not only to the categories, but also to the three normative sciences he would
later on identify: esthetics, ethics, and logic.
6 A different account of  the origin of  Peirce’s interest in ethics has been given by the
editors of the Peirce Edition Project: “This was in connection with his research for the
Century Dictionary, for which Peirce wrote hundreds of philosophical definitions, including
the entries for ‘ethics’ and ‘moral’” (EP2: 252, note 21). Indeed, with the dictionary project
in mind, Peirce began to teach at the Johns Hopkins University a new course on
“philosophical terminology” in the fall of 1883; and it is almost certain that both the
dictionary  project  and  the  course  on  philosophical  terminology  influenced  his  later
investigations on the “ethics of terminology” (CP 2.220 ff., 1903), which Max Fisch (1981:
30) suggested, “probably had something to do with Peirce’s growing interest in ethics.”9
But while there seems to be a chronological coincidence between Peirce’s positive views
of ethics in the 1900s and his ethics of terminology, I believe it was his interest in ethics
that prompted an ethical consideration of terminology, and not the other way round.
Moreover, even though by 1883 Peirce had already begun working in many definitions for
the Dictionary, he would only write the entries for letter “E” in 1886 (W5: 388 ff., 1884-86).
10
7 Now, perhaps the most important event of 1883 was the publication of the long- awaited
Studies in Logic, a book edited by Peirce – though his name did not appear on the title page
– and produced by his students from Johns Hopkins, described as “Members of the Johns
Hopkins University.” This book was a result of Peirce’s intensive work on logic, both as
investigator and teacher. To be sure, Peirce hinted at the significance of ethics to logic in
a syllabus of sixty lectures on logic, written in the summer of 1883, where he explicitly
referred  to  “a  close  connection  between  logic  and  ethics”  (W4:  476,  1883).  Two
peculiarities in Peirce’s writings about logic at this time are worth mentioning: first, his
emphasis on the practical side of logic – that is, “to teach us how to reach the truth”;11
second, his characterization of reasoning as a voluntary operation, so that “we may say
that it [logic] is the art of reasoning rightly, or that it is a science which centres [sic]
about  this  art”  (W4:  400-1,  1883).  Here  Peirce  takes  for  granted the  notion of  “self-
control” as a fundamental aspect of logical reasoning, which later on determined his
reevaluation of ethics. However, he was still far from reaching his mature position.
8 This is clear in a letter he wrote to his former student Christine Ladd-Franklin in 1902,
when she came to lecture on logic  at  the Johns Hopkins.  Peirce regretted his  crude
opinions about ethics in the 1880s:
My dear Mrs. Franklin: It gives me joy to learn that you are to lecture on logic at the
Johns Hopkins. But, oh, you will not have such a wonderful and charming class as I
had, especially the first year. In those days I knew very little about logic, and did
not even thoroughly understand upon what logic is based. I was not in possession of
the proof that the science of logic must be based on the science of ethics, although I
more or less perceived that sound reasoning depends more on sound morals than
anything else. (Apud Ladd-Franklin, 1916: 715-22)
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9 So, even though Peirce began to show some interest in ethical themes in the 1880s, he was
not yet convinced about the connection between logic and ethics. I suspect an important
inkling of his change of mind occurred around 1896-97.
10 Peirce  scholars  have disagreed about  when and why Peirce  changed his  mind about
ethics. Indeed, it is hard to be sure, for his own remarks about it fluctuated: in 1903 Peirce
assumed  that  until  around  1899  he  was  “not  prepared  to  affirm  that  ethics  was  a
normative science” (CP 5.129, 1903); but in 1902 he declared that it was until around 1897.
(CP 2.198, 1902) This latter account seems quite inconsistent with his 1898 suspicion of
ethics (CP 1,618 ff., 1898). Moreover, around 1905 he told us that it was during the Lowell
Lectures (delivered in the end of 1903) that he first asserted that logic was to be based
upon ethics (CP 5.333, c. 1905); but this account does not seem to square either, for Peirce
had written extensively about the normative sciences in his 1901-02 manuscripts of the
Minute Logic.
11 According to Richard Robin (1964: 271), “Peirce’s views on the normative sciences did not
‘come out of the blue’.” Peirce’s mature consideration of norms and values is an extension
of  his  theory of  inquiry.  Manley Thompson (1963:  195)  agrees:  “Truth as the goal  of
scientific inquiry is thus a phase of the summum bonum, a phase of the final end of all
human action.” In a similar direction, Christopher Hookway (1997: 202) suggests that one
might see Peirce’s late insistence on ethics as a result of his attempt to “provide a unified
model of self-control, and hence of rationality.” Murray Murphey (1993: 361) notes that as
early  as  1893  Peirce  had  already  asserted  that  logical  reasoning  was  a  controlled
operation of  thought;  and from then on,  the recognition that  logic  was a  normative
science was only a step. However, as Murphey adds, at this point Peirce had also been
influenced by his psychological work undertaken in conjunction with Joseph Jastrow back
in the 1880s, as well as and by the publication of William James’ book, The Principles of
Psychology (1890): “It was also James’ doctrine that the truth is a species of the good which
suggested to Peirce the idea of the dependence of logic on ethics.”
12 David Elmer Pfeifer (1971: 66) suggests that the elements for a discussion of ethics were
already present in the Monist papers, published in 1892-3, where Peirce introduced the
ideas of absolute chance (tychism), continuity (synechism), and evolutionary love (agapism).
In these papers, Peirce discussed the notion of an end, which raised the question of value:
“Although Peirce does not discuss an ultimate end...we are at the point where the kinds of
considerations, which may lead directly to normative science and the summum bonum, are
present.” Also, “another possible source of Peirce’s reevaluation of Ethics,” Edward Petry
(1992:  681) believes,  “is his study of the writings of  Johann Friedrich Herbart,  whose
division  of  the  normative  sciences  was  referred  to  in  a  manuscript  just  before  his
reevaluation (MS 400).” Fisch (1981: 30) argues that a more “decisive event” was Peirce’s
application  of  Wicenty  Lutoslawski’s  “method  of  stylometry”  to  Plato’s  ethics.
Lutoslawski (1897) applied statistical analysis to his observations of the peculiarities in
the style of Plato’s writings;  and Peirce decided to apply Lutoslawski’s method to his
study of Plato’s ethics.  In his Minute Logic Peirce devoted approximately 125 pages to
discuss Plato’s dialogues, and this undertaking seems to be related to his interest in ethics
(CP 1.584, note 1).12
To the above, I want to add another possible explanation. I suspect the recognition of real
possibilities  among other  factors  usually  accepted  by  Peircean scholars  prompted  the
growth of his conception of ethics.13 Robert Lane’s (2007) study has shown that until
1896-97 Peirce held the idea that the “possible” could only be identified in terms of a
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concrete “state of information”; that is, in terms of the existent state of information of an
actual  speaker.  Hence,  “it  is  possible  that  p”  meant  that  “in  the  present  state  of
information, it is not known to be false that p.” However, in the end of 1896 Peirce began
to see that the “possible” might also be defined in terms of an “Ideal World,” a kind of
Platonic universe. As Peirce wrote: “a possibility remains possible when it is not actual,”
because the possible is not “what the actual makes it to be” (CP1.422, 1896). This is the
great error of the nominalist schools,  Peirce argues;  namely,  “that the quality of red
depends  on  anybody  actually  seeing  it.”  The  universe  of  real  possibilities  is  not
determined by the existing world, but belongs to an Ideal World, i.e. a world that ought to
be.
13 This explanation seems chronologically plausible in view of the development of Peirce’s
effort to establish a classification of the sciences in the last decade of the nineteenth
century. The marginal place he attributed to ethics in his classificatory scheme started to
undergo serious revisions in 1896-97, a period in which he made considerable changes in
his  classification.  From 1892 to 1898,  Peirce attempted to draw at  least  ten different
classificatory schemes; and in the manuscripts dated 1896 onwards (Kent 1987: 100), he
ventured tentatively to incorporate ethics as a normative science among the divisions of
Philosophy.
14 The above explanations do not exhaust the subject; besides, there seems to be no single
event but a congeries of facts to account for Peirce’s interest in ethics and his radical
change of  mind.  I  shall  now turn to a  developmental and categorical  analysis  of  his
different conceptions of ethics.
 
2. The Growth of Peirce’s Ethics 
Phase 1: Morality and Secondness
15 In a manuscript from 1896, “Lessons from the History of Science,” Peirce declared that
morality  is  essentially  conservative,  and  that  “conservatism  about  morals  leads  to
conservatism about manners and finally to conservatism about opinions of a speculative
kind” (CP 1.50, 1896).  So, for the sake of good reasoning, to avoid what Peirce called
“sham” or “make-believe” reasoning, ethics and philosophy were to be regarded as two
distinct  disciplines.  Ironically,  as  Cornelis  de  Waal  (2012:  89)  observes,  at  this  point
Peirce’s “ethics of inquiry seems to preclude ethical inquiry.”
16 Peirce said in 1896:
In short, as morality supposes self-control, men learn that they must not surrender
themselves unreservedly to any method, without considering to what conclusions it
will  lead  them.  But  this  is  utterly  contrary  to  the  single-mindedness  that  is
requisite in science. (CP 1.57, 1896)
17 It is surprising that at this point Peirce rejected the science of ethics on the basis of self-
control, for not only had he affirmed in the 1880s that logical inferences were voluntary
and controlled operations of thought, and thus could be subject to criticism and classified
as good or bad (W 4: 401, 1883); but he repeated this same idea in a manuscript written
around 1893 (CP 7.444, 1893). Moreover, the notion of self- control would influence his
decisive conclusion that logic rests on ethics, as well as his hesitation about including
esthetics among the normative sciences.
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18 In  the opening lecture of  his  famous 1898 Cambridge Conferences  Peirce  echoed his
negative arguments about ethics. He denounced the belief that progress in philosophy
naturally  affects  moral  culture.  Peirce  confessed  to  standing  in  this  respect  as  “a
scientific man, condemning with the whole strength of conviction the Hellenic tendency
to  mingle  philosophy  and  practice”  (CP  1.618,  1898).  Ethics  was  described  as  a
“conservative,”  “dubious,”  “wretched,”  and  “positively  dangerous”  subject.  Peirce
proceeded  by  drawing  a  sharp  line  between  reasoning,  as  the  distinctive  feature  of
philosophical and scientific inquiry, and instinct or sentiment, as the source to which one
should look in deciding matters of vital importance, such as moral and religious issues.
19 Peirce’s argument in 1896 and 1898 was twofold: not only is “an exaggerated regard for
morality  unfavorable  to  scientific  progress”  (CP 1.50,  1896),  but  also the recourse to
reasoning in moral  affairs  is  risky to morality itself.  In the first  case,  since morality
implies conservatism, and since conservatism is detrimental  to free inquiry,  morality
should be “put out of sight by the investigator” (CP 1.640, 1898). In the second case, the
rejection of  reasoning in practical  affairs had to do with Peirce’s  theory of  belief,  as
articulated in his 1877 essay “The Fixation of Belief.”
20 Scientific inquiry, Peirce affirmed, can only progress through doubt; but doubt can give
no direction to human conduct. Recall Peirce’s words in 1877: “The feeling of believing is
a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which
will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect” (CP 5.371, 1877). Hence, when
it comes to moral and vitally practical affairs, as opposed to science, one must be capable
of action; and “the principle upon which we are willing to act is a belief” (CP 1.636, 1898).
But if reasoning requires a man to be ready to abandon his beliefs, as Peirce affirmed, it
follows that reasoning as such is detrimental to moral conduct. In 1896 Peirce explained:
If a proposition is to be applied to action, it has to be embraced, or believed without
reservation. There is no room for doubt, which can only paralyze action. But the
scientific spirit requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole cart-load
of beliefs, the moment experience is against them. (CP 1.55, 1896)
21 Peirce had in mind the moral standards of the gentlemen that were in direct opposition
to the ideas of freedom and public spirit,  which were required for the existence of a
scientific  community  (CP  1.673,  1898).  Perhaps  this  explains  Peirce’s  apology  to
“conservative sentimentalism,” which should be understood as a form of irony (CP 1.662,
1898).  It  is  inevitable  not  to  see  a  taste  for  irony  in  these  passages.  Conservative
sentimentalism meant not trusting to reasoning in matters of vital importance – and this
is  exactly  what  the  conservative  gentlemen  did  not  do  under  the  rubric  of
“conservatism.” Peirce calls for an opposite meaning under the same rubric, and this is
his chief irony. While conservative gentlemen proclaim the subordination of sentiments
to  individual  reason,  a  conservative  sentimentalist  like  Peirce,  conversely,  rates  his
individual reason modestly and proclaims the subordination of reason to sentiments (CP
1.634, 1898).
22 It  is  important  to  note  here  that  “sentimentalism”  is  an  ambiguous  term.  Roughly,
“sentimentalism”  can  mean  trusting  human’s  altruistic  sentiments  against  natural
selfishness; but it can also mean that passions have a primordial, overriding role against
reasons – the latter is the view adopted by David Hume and his followers. Peirce was
certainly a sentimentalist in the first sense, but not so clearly in the second sense (W 8:
188-9,  1892).  In  respect  to  the  first  sense,  altruism  is  a  theme  present  in  Peirce’s
philosophy as early as the second half of the 1860s, and it is the fundamental argument he
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articulated to explain the validity of the logic of science. Meaning resides not on what can
be interpreted by a conscious individual, but on what can come to be connected to an
interpretant in subsequent thoughts (W 2: 323, 1865). Peirce corrected Descartes’ analysis
of cognition as conscious intuition by showing that thought cannot be valid in subjective,
individual,  singular  episodes.  Thought  calls  for  a  sequence  of  inferences;  therefore,
“nothing which can happen to a man’s self should be of more consequence to him than
everything else. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is
illogical in all his inferences, collectively” (W 2: 270, 1869).14 At this juncture, Peirce saw
ethics and philosophy as belonging to “radically foreign” departments. As Kent (1987:
106) notes, in 1898 “it is evident that Peirce had not yet made any attempt to bring logic
and ethics together under the umbrella of the normative sciences.” Ethics was a branch of
Practical Science, almost an affair of Art, a subject completely devoid of any scientific
character, whereas Philosophy was a branch of Theoretical Science:
Philosophy seems to consist of two parts, Logic and Metaphysics. I exclude Ethics,
for two reasons. In the first place, as the science of the end and aim of life [ethics]
seems  to  be  exclusively  psychical,  and  therefore  to  be  confined  to  a  special
department  of  experience,  while  philosophy  studies  experience  in  its  universal
characteristics.  In the second place,  in seeking to define the proper aim of  life,
ethics seems to me to rank with the arts. (RLT 115-6, 1898)
23 This  brings  me  to  my  central  question.  Peirce’s  first  mind  about  ethics  (or  better,
morality)  appears  to  be  related  to  his  category  of  Secondness;  and  this  apparently
explains why he would not regard ethics as an important topic (Mayorga, 2009: 69). As
Peirce tells us, the category of Secondness consists of the actual facts that are present in
the  concrete  world.  The  experiences  that  fall  under  the  category  of  Secondness  are
individuals,  in  the  sense  that  they insist  in  being here  and now “irrespective  of  any
reason,” or general law (CP 1.434.  1896).  A Second is a brute fact,  and it will  remain
contingent and accidental until any reason enters and serves as a Third mediator. The
manifestation of Secondness is most prominent in the ideas of struggle, action, reaction,
shock, constraint, volition, action, inhibition, effort, aggressiveness, brutality, resistance, 
duality etc. It can be logically represented as a dyadic relation, where two elements are
brought in connection arbitrarily; that is, with no reason or mediating third.
24 For  the  present  purpose,  the  most  important  character  that  the  individuality  of
Secondness implies is that the individual “is determinate in regard to every possibility”
(CP 1.435, 1896). Peirce calls this the principle of excluded middle:  “Those objects of the
universe which do not possess a given character possess another character which, in
reference to that universe, is in the relation of negation to the first” (CP 1.450). Thus, the
distinctions that apply to a Second are always dualistic in nature (CP 1.330, 1894).
As Peirce wrote in 1896:
One of the worst effects of the influence of moral and religious reasonings upon
science lies in this, that the distinctions upon which both insist as fundamental are
dual distinctions, and that their tendency is toward an ignoring of all distinctions
that are not dual and especially of the conception of continuity. (CP 1.61, 1896)
25 Peirce’s notion of morality gives emphasis to concrete ideals of  conduct,  such as the
positive moral standards of an individual or a given community. Positive moral standards
are always concerned with dual distinctions: good and bad; right and wrong; authorized
and prohibited;  legal  and illegal.  It  would be a nominalistic  mistake to attribute any
philosophical  importance  to  individual,  or  idiosyncratic  positive  moral  reactions
(Mayorga 2012). Generality is the key feature that is absent in Peirce’s first notion of
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morality, for the possible variations of ideals of conduct appear to be exhausted in a
multitude of existing dualisms.
26 The 1898 Cambridge Conferences represented the last  moment Peirce would publicly
express  his  disparaging  attitude  toward  ethics.  Peirce’s  words  were  strong,  and  his
sarcastic tone almost certainly had to do with his disagreements with William James
about the vitality of the topic to be addressed.15 Whatever the case may be I believe it is
wrong to simply dismiss his arguments or even to try to conflate these passages with later
extracts. Indeed, Peirce himself confessed his crude view about ethics in a letter to James
written in November 25, 1902:
When I gave my Cambridge lectures I had not really got to the bottom of it or seen
the unity of the whole thing. It was not until after that that I obtained the proof
that logic must be founded on ethics. (CP 8.256, 1902)
 
Phase 2: Pure Ethics and Thirdness
27 Peirce’s positive attitude toward ethics was enunciated in a 1901 review of a book on
ethics  written by Edward Mezes.  Peirce  described Mezes’  work as  a  kind of  “ethical
anthropology,” the study of what men consider to be moral, and he thinks that this is not
the kind of study representative of what he now decided to call “Pure Ethics.” Peirce
insisted  on  favoring  a  conservative  viewpoint  in  regard  to  morals,  as  he  did  in  his
Cambridge lectures in 1898, but at this time he contended that “in pure theory, especially
in a theory of aims, conservatism is irrational and out of place” (CP 8.158, 1901). He wrote
specifically that “logic rests on ethics to a degree that few are aware of”; that “ethics as a
positive science must rest on observed facts”; and that “the only solid foundation for
ethics lies on those facts of everyday life which no skeptical philosopher ever yet really
called in question” (CP 8.158, 1901).
28 Peirce’s new conception of ethics gained better expression in the 1902 manuscripts of
Minute Logic. He admitted that for a long time ethics seemed to him to be “completely
foreign to logic”; and that he doubted whether it was “anything more than a practical
science, or Art” (CP 2.198). But in 1902 he told us that he was beginning to see the subtlety
of ethics, for logic “can be of no avail until one knows what it is that one is trying to do,
which is  precisely what ethics has to determine” (CP 2.120,  1902).  Ethics,  in his new
scenario,  “affords a quite indispensable help to the understanding of  logic” (CP 2.82,
1902). Peirce’s logic reconsidered in the light of ethics looks like this:
Now logic is a study of the means of attaining the end of thought. It cannot solve
that problem until it clearly knows what that end is. Life can have but one end. It is
Ethics which defines that end [...]. Had I fully comprehended this great principle
early in life, I should undoubtedly have been over-influenced by the moral spirit.
(CP 2.198, 1902)
29 From 1902  onwards  Peirce  classified  Pure  Ethics  as  a  Normative  Science,  a  positive
science that asserts positive truths, which result from categorical facts. “That truth and
justice are great powers in the world is no figure of speech, but a plain fact to which
theories must accommodate themselves” (CP 1.348, 1903).
30 Peirce assumes that Pure Ethics is a strictly theoretical subject and must not be confused
with the practical discipline of morality. Pure Ethics is the study of what ought to be
regarded as the nature of right conduct, the so-called summum bonum. Peirce stresses that
its aim is not to provide a catalog of ideals for the classification of human conduct in the
classes of right and wrong, a sort of “casuistic ethics.” Underlying this problem is the task
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of establishing the nature of the categories of right and wrong (CP2.198, 1902).16 Pure
Ethics  can  thus  be  identified  with  what  present-  day  philosophers  describe  as
“Metaethics,”  a  branch  of  Moral  Philosophy  concerned  with  second-order  ethical
questions.17 Metaethics is contrasted with Normative Ethics, which deals with first-order
questions such as “Should I give to famine relief?” or “Should I return the wallet I found
on the street?” The second-order questions that Metaethics attempts to address refer to
issues that are metaphysical, epistemological, phenomenological, psychological, etc.: “Do
moral properties exist?” “Is there moral knowledge?” “Can we justify moral claims?”
“Are moral qualities external?” “What psychological state expresses a moral judgment?”
31 Peirce’s Pure Ethics was not intended to engage with practical questions. He insisted that
Pure Ethics had no aspiration to guide human conduct: “It is only intended to be pure
theory” (CP 5.125,  1903).  Though I  understand that  pure and practical  ethics  can be
discriminated, I do not believe it is correct to say that they can be completely separated,
or dissociated; for the mere possibility of engaging with practical questions trades on
metaethical considerations.  Peirce’s separation thesis should therefore be weakened.18
Contemporary theories of Normative Ethics disagree not just about what should be done
in particular scenarios, but more fundamentally about why a specific course of action
should be preferred; but in order for someone to engage in these first-order questions, it
is requisite to assume a theoretical position in Metaethics that favors the view that these
questions can themselves be answered in a justified way. In this sense, although Peirce’s
Pure Ethics is  not intended to guide conduct,  it  has a certain priority over practical
questions.  I  cannot prescind practice from theory; though I can abstract theory from
practice.19
32 In the beginning of 1903 Peirce advanced significantly in his thinking about the relation
between logic and ethics in a series of lectures entitled “Pragmatism as a Principle and
Method of Right Thinking,” delivered at Harvard University. Parenthetically it may be
worth noting that Peirce opened his lectures by confessing that his earlier philosophical
views  obstructed  him  from  perceiving  “the  advantage  of  being  well  imbued  with
pragmatism in the conduct of life” (RLT: 109, 1903) – a reference to the title of his inaugural
lecture in the 1898 Cambridge Conferences, “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,” where
he dismissed ethics as useless science. Now the theme of the 1903 Harvard lectures gave
Peirce the opportunity to review his  version of  pragmatism and relate it  to his  new
conception of the normative sciences.
33 As a principle of logic, it would be wrong to interpret the Pragmatic Maxim as making
meaning, which is the “intellectual purport” of concepts, lie in individual action. Peirce
had no doubt that action is the upshot of belief, but the meaning of concepts could not be
of an individual  instance,  for it  would have to be general;  more properly,  “conditional
general resolutions to act” (CP 5.403, note 3, 1906).
34 Until this period, Peirce did not regard logical reasoning as a controlled operation of
thought.  But now he sees the operation of  drawing an inference as a deliberate and
purposive action, for it involves an approval of the inference. Every reasoner has the
purpose of attaining truth; consequently, he is always conscious of proceeding according
to “patterns of  right  reasoning” (CP 1.606,  1903).  The reasoner usually  compares his
inference with the general norms of right reasoning in a deliberate, critical, and self-
controlled attitude. “Logic is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as
such,  must  appeal  to  ethics  for  its  principles”  (CP  1.191,  1903).  There  is  a  perfect
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parallelism between reasoning and moral conduct, and this happens to be so in virtue of
the element of self-control.20
35 Peirce’s “second mind” about ethics (or better, Pure Ethics) appears to be related to his
category of Thirdness.  Roughly, the Third category includes everything that is of the
nature of a law and involves the ideas of generality and continuity. It requires the human
mind as a “subject foreign to mere individual action” where cognition takes place (CP
1.420, 1896). In the logic of relations, the idea of a law presents itself as a triad, since it
involves a third element that mediates between two other elements, a first and a second;
and its mode of being, “consists in the Secondness that it determines” (CP 1.536, 1903).
Thirdness belongs to a world of necessity; it is “how an endless future must continue to
be” (CP 1.536, 1903).
36 Pure Ethics  is  related to the category of  Thirdness because it  is  not  concerned with
individuality, understood as concrete ideals of conduct (morality), but with generality,
understood as habits of conduct. Peirce is not interested in action per se, which belongs to
the  domain  of  Secondness,  as  explained  in  the  previous  section,  but  rather  in  the
“governing,” “mediation,” or “self-control” of human action:
[The]  pragmaticist  does  not  make  the  summum  bonum  to  consist  in  action,  but
makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more
and more to embody those generals […]. In its higher stages, evolution takes place
more and more largely through self-control, and this gives the pragmaticist a sort
of justification for making the rational purport to be general. (CP 5, 433, 1905)
37 The point here, which Peirce advanced in the 1903 Lowell Lectures and after, is that the
ultimate  ideal  lies  in  the process  of  self-control,  the  development  of  what  he  called
“concrete reasonableness” (CP 5.3, 1902).21 Peirce can now see beyond the dualisms that
characterize positive morality – they are mere fragments of the process of self-control.
Continuity is the key notion in his procedural picture of Pure Ethics. Peirce now sees an
element of generality in ideals of conduct because he does not take them to be a fragment
of a continuous process, but the continuous process itself; i.e. ideals of conduct are seen
as relations of ideals of conduct. When Pure Ethics is procedurally understood in light of
Peirce’s idea of continuity, the role of generality becomes clearer.
38 To sum up, I recall again Peirce’s words:
I have advanced my understanding of these categories much since Cambridge days;
and can now put them in a much clearer light and more convincingly. The true
nature of pragmatism cannot be understood without them. It does not, as I seem to
have thought at first, take Reaction as the be-all, but it takes the end-all as the be-
all,  and the  End is  something that  gives  its  sanction to  action.  It  is  of  the  third
category. (CP 8.256, 1902; emphasis added)
 
Phase 3: Esthetics and Qualitative Thirdness
39 It  was also in view of  the controlled character of  logic and ethics that Peirce would
initially object to the inclusion of esthetics among the normative sciences: “that which
renders logic and ethics peculiarly normative is that nothing can be either logically true
or morally good without a purpose to be so,” whereas “a thing is beautiful or ugly quite
irrespective of any purpose to be so” (CP 1.575, 1902). What provoked his reconsideration
of esthetics was the answer to the question of the ultimate end of conduct, the summum
bonum. Peirce thought that the ultimate end of conduct would have to be an ideal that
had  a  quality  desirable  in  itself.  Therefore,  Peirce  believed  that  it  was  the  business
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neither of the logician nor of the moralist to decide the matter, for if the ultimate end
were to be a quality, it was rather the business of the esthetician to decide (CP 2.199,
1902).
40 Now,  “in  the  light  of  the  doctrine  of  categories,”  Peirce  wrote,  “an  object,  to  be
esthetically good, must have a multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a
positive simple immediate quality to their totality” (CP 5.131,  1903).  But a quality of
feeling is  specifically  what  best  describes  the  category of  Firstness.  Should one thus
interpret Peirce’s assertion that esthetics is “the basic normative science upon which as a
foundation the doctrine of ethics must be reared” (CP 5.37, 1903) as an indication that he
finally came to see ethics as a subject that belongs to the category of Firstness? Did Peirce
at last approve a kind of ethical hedonism?
41 Peirce was quite distressed by this latter objection. The assumption that logic rests on
ethics and ethics on esthetics would eventually lead to the conclusion that reasoning
could be reduced to a matter of taste; but most of all it meant the reducibility of truth,
which is an affair of the Third category, to a quality of feeling, which is an affair of the
First category – a reducibility that Peirce’s theory of the universal categories was not
willing to admit. So, in the course of his argument for pragmatism in the 1903 Harvard
lectures Peirce was led to discuss the idea of reducing one category to another. The main
target of Peirce’s objection was the notion of Gefühl, or Feeling of Logicality, as proposed by
the German logician Christopher Sigwart in the 1870s. To entertain this opinion was “to
refer truth to the category of Quality of Feeling” (EP 2: 166, 1903). Peirce wanted to repel
attacks upon his categories which assumed that “the idea of Reaction can be reduced to
that of Quality of Feeling and that the idea of Representation to those of Reaction or
Quality of Feeling taken together” (EP 2: 177, 1903). And I suspect it was this concern in
particular which led him to explore during the Harvard lectures the degenerate forms of
the categories (the topic of the next section).
42 To be sure, the notion of “esthetical goodness” constitutes perhaps the most enigmatic
idea in Peirce’s normative sciences. It is a quite complex notion, for Peirce did not equate
it with a mere quality of feeling. “Esthetic enjoyment” should be regarded as a kind of
“reasonable feeling,” i.e. a feeling one can comprehend; a sort of “intellectual sympathy”
(CP 5.113, 1903). Peirce himself recognized the complexity of his conception: “I do not
succeed in saying exactly what it is, but it is a consciousness belonging to the category of
Representation, though representing something in the Category of Quality of Feeling”
(CP 5.1113, 1903).
43 To clarify the notion of esthetical goodness, it might be helpful to contrast it with Peirce’s
idea of the “percept,” which he introduced at just about the same time as he came to
regard the normative science of esthetics (CP 2.27, 1902). Peirce wrote that the percept is
“a quality of feeling or sensation,” which consists of “a single and undivided whole,” and
thus is related to the category of genuine Firstness (CP 7.625, 1903). The process through
which the percept comes to mind is not under the control of thought; for “it silently
forces itself upon me” (CP 7.621, 1903). Thus, the percept could never be pronounced as
either  good  or  bad.  On  the  other  hand,  esthetical  goodness  is  under  the  control  of
thought, or else there would be no point in classifying esthetics as a normative science.
Hence, esthetical goodness, unlike the percept, cannot be equated to a First – though it
has a component of Firstness, as every category of experience does.22 Indeed, the notion
of  esthetical  goodness  is  closer  to  that  of  “perceptual  judgment,”  for  it  includes  an
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element  of  Thirdness.  The  perceptual  judgment  happens  the  moment  a  percept  is
contemplated:
The  great  overshadowing  point  of  difference  is  that  the  perceptual  judgment
professes to represent something […]. This is a very important difference, since the
idea of representation is essentially what may be termed an element of “Thirdness”
[…]. In a perceptual judgment the mind professes to tell the mind’s future self what
the character of the present percept is. The percept, on the contrary, stands on its
own legs and makes no professions of any kind. (CP 7.630, 1903)
44 The concept of the percept was then able to accommodate the experience of genuine
Firstness, which might otherwise be thought to relate to esthetics.
45 The difficulty in finding a place for esthetics among Peirce’s categories has raised
46 the question whether one should propose the inclusion of a Fourth category. Herbert W.
Schneider (1952) was the first to present this argument.  He assumes that,  besides an
abstract and formal conception of the normative ideal, there is another kind of value
situation in Peirce’s thinking, which he called “Importance.” Accordingly, the notion of
importance  relates  to  the  idea  of  “conscious  satisfaction.”  This  is  a concrete  value
situation where satisfaction is felt, andthuscannot be related tothecategory ofThirdness,
for it inevitably “retracts” to Firstness. So Fourthness, he argues, is not a substitute for
Thirdness, but an addition to it. Schneider’s words seem to reiterate Peirce’s in the CP
5.113  passage  above  mentioned:  Fourthness  is  “the  peculiar  satisfaction  which
accompanies an interest which is perfectly understood” (1952:  212).  In a rejoinder to
Schneider,  Carl  R.  Hausman (1979)  expresses a  similar  but  more ambiguous position.
Although he denies Schneider’s call for a Fourth category, Hausman assumes that the
three universal categories are insufficient to account for the role of esthetical value in
Peirce’s  philosophy.  Since  esthetical  goodness  is  a  rather  complex  value  notion that
should not be confused with the category of Firstness, Hausman argues that it has to
“function” as a Fourth category,  without actually being one;  that is  to say,  a  Fourth
element that is co-present and irreducible to the other categories.23
47 For  my  part,  I  think  a  full-scale  account  of  the  category  of  Thirdness  is  needed  to
repudiate  the  inclusion  of  Fourthness.  Peirce  did  not equate  value  with  esthetical
goodness alone; but with a complex triadic structure that elicits not only the idea of
beauty,  but also the notions of right and truth.  As I  understand,  Peirce argued for a
threefold notion of the normative ideal, in which logic, ethics, and esthetics are equally
identified with the category of Thirdness. Murphey confirms this interpretation:
That which seems to constitute the acme of beauty for Peirce is the Firstness of
genuine Thirdness carried to the furthest extreme – that is to say, it is the quality
arising from order, and the more developed the order the greater the beauty […].
Now that  order  will  be  the result  of  laws or  habits  –  Thirds  which control  the
arrangement of the aggregate of Seconds. (Murphey, 1993: 363)
48 As I will explain, the fact that esthetical goodness is at the bottom of the hierarchy of the
normative sciences has to be understood as a logical requirement necessitated by Peirce’s
theory of the categories – Firstness is the primary element of experience, the one element
that can be prescinded from all categories.
49 In a relatively unknown passage, Peirce wrote:
[Esthetics  is]  the  total  unanalyzable  impression  of  a  reasonableness  that  has
expressed itself in a creation. It is a pure Feeling but a feeling that is the Impress of
a Reasonableness that Creates. It is the Firstness that truly belongs to a Thirdness in
its achievement of Secondness. (MS 310.9, 1903)24
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3. The Threefold Ideal and the Degenerate Forms of
Thirdness
50 And so I come to my concluding remarks. I believe the degeneracy of the categories can
shed light on the final stage of Peirce’s understanding of ethics, where he proposed that
both  logical  and  moral  goodness,  which  are  Thirds,  are  somehow  dependent  upon
esthetical  goodness,  which  merely  “appears”  as  a  First.  Briefly,  the  categories  of
Secondness  and  Thirdness  can  assume  degenerate  forms,  in  which  their  characters
appear weak and disfigured (CP 5.70, 1903); and this weakness can sometimes lead us to
confuse one category with another. In order to understand these degenerate forms, the
prescindibility of the categories is a key idea.
51 “Prescission”25 implies less than dissociation and more than distinction. It happens when
one can hypothetically consider one category while deliberately neglecting the existence
of  another.  It  is  a  mere  “supposition,”  where  “exclusive  attention”  is  given  to  one
category  in  detriment  of  another.  It  means  that  one  element  can  be  detached,  or
abstracted from the other.  But  separation by prescission is  not  a  reciprocal  process,
Peirce observed (EP1: 3, 1968). That is, one can deliberately suppose uncolored space, but
not color without space. “While A cannot be prescinded from B, B can be prescinded from
A.” Categorically speaking, one can suppose a First without a Second, but not a Second
without a First;  or,  in other words, Firstness can be prescinded from Secondness and
Thirdness, and Secondness can be prescinded from Thirdness – but no Thirdness can be
prescinded from Secondness and Firstness; and no Secondness can be prescinded from
Firstness.  Each  category  can  only  be  prescinded,  or  supposedly  detached  from,  the
category that comes next. (It is not accidental that Peirce decided to name his categories
Firstness,  Secondness,  and  Thirdness  –  which  are  ordinal,  not  cardinal,  numbers,
indicating a hierarchy.)
52 Secondness and Thirdness are conceptions of complexity (CP 1.526, 1903). This means
that the conception of the category of Secondness is that of an actual fact which requires
the existence of two different objects: a first and a second – it involves a dyadic relation.
The same applies  to the conception of  the category of  Thirdness,  for it  involves the
presence of three different elements: a first and a second that act in response to one
another in virtue of a third – it involves a triadic relation. In contrast, the conception of
the category of Firstness involves no other element beyond itself; it is a monad, which has
an “Extremely Rudimentary Character” (CP 5.68,  1903).  Hence,  the degeneracy of  the
categories of Secondness and Thirdness, as opposed to the category of Firstness, derives
specifically  from  the  logical  complexity  implicated  in  dyadic  and  triadic  relations.
Consider the following:
Where you have a triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you have
two  units.  Thus,  Secondness  is  an  essential  part  of  Thirdness  though  not  of
Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness.
Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of Thirdness. But
there is  no Secondness  of  pure Firstness  and no Thirdness  of  pure Firstness  or
Secondness. (CP 1.530, 1903)
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So, while Secondness can be expressed in two different ways, one genuine and another
degenerate; and Thirdness can be expressed in three different ways, one genuine and two
degenerate;  the category of  Firstness  accepts  no degeneracy.  Let  me draw a  graphic
representation of Peirce’s explanation:
Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3
53 Figures  1,  2,  and  3  illustrate  how Firstness  can  be  prescinded from Secondness  and
Thirdness; how Secondness can be prescinded from Thirdness; how neither Secondness
nor Thirdness can be prescinded from Firstness; and finally how Thirdness cannot be
prescinded from Secondness. The number of bold characters (“a,” “b,” or “c”) indicates
the category to which each figure refers, and the bold borders highlight the degenerate
forms  that  each  category  can  assume.  For  example,  in  Figure  2  there  are  two  bold
characters, “a” and “b,” indicating that it refers to the category of Secondness; and a bold
border surrounds characters “a” and “ab,” respectively, indicating that there are such
degenerate forms of Secondness – the Firstness of Secondness and the Secondness of
Secondness  (Pure  Secondness).  Conversely,  the  dotted  border  surrounding  the  set
comprised by “abc” in Figure 2 indicates that Thirdness cannot be prescinded either from
Secondness or Firstness – there is no Thirdness of Secondness. So, in order to picture the
degenerate forms of each category, one should focus on the bold letters and the bold
borders.
54 For present purposes, I shall focus on Thirdness (Fig. 3). Peirce explains that the self-
development of the category of Thirdness results in a trichotomy that gives rise to three
sub-classes: “a relatively genuine thirdness, a relatively Reactional Thirdness or thirdness
of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a relatively Qualitative Thirdness or thirdness of
the  last  degeneracy”  (CP  5.72,  1903).  However,  as  Peirce  explains,  the  subsequent
divisions will  not entirely follow a trichotomy; they will  divide in different ways. For
instance, Reactional Thirdness will follow the manner of the divisions of the category of
Secondness – it will divide in two; and Qualitative Thirdness will not divide at all. To
illustrate  these  three  divisions  of  Thirdness  and  its  subsequent  subdivisions,  Peirce
devised the following diagram (EP 2, 162, 1903):
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55 Two conclusions can be drawn from the diagram above: First, that the triad involves all
three  categories  of  experience,26 so  there  is  always  one leg  of  the  triplet  where the
category of Thirdness is genuine; another leg where it is degenerate to a lesser degree,
revealing its Secondness (Reactional Thirdness); and a third one where it is degenerate to
a greater degree, revealing its Firstness (Qualitative Thirdness). This first conclusion is
consistent with Peirce’s assertion that Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness must all be
present in every phenomenon, “one being perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that
phenomena  than  another”  (CP  5.43,  1903).  The  second  conclusion  is  that  the  only
subdivisions that can be carried on ad infinitum are those of genuine Thirdness. These
infinite  subdivisions  of  the  Third  disclose  an  endless  series  of  representational
experiences that indicate the idea of continuity and illustrate Thirdness to perfection (CP
1.337, 1875).
56 Qualitative Thirdness conveys the appearance that the Third category is from the world
of feelings. Peirce calls this feeling an “instigation of thought”; an “embryonic being.”
Peirce explained:
The most degenerate Thirdness is where we conceive a mere Quality of Feeling, or
Firstness, to represent itself to itself as Representation. Such, for example, would be
Pure Self-Consciousness, which might be roughly described as a mere feeling that
has a dark instinct of being a germ of thought. (CP 5.71, 1903)27
57 So now we can see that the normative ideal has a threefold dimension. In the line of the
divisions of the Genuine Third one can relate it to the idea of true continuity (logic), and
thus understand its evolutionary character (CP 5.3, 1902) – what is to be believed as the
ultimate good in its genuine form will be defined by a future interpretant of the ideal,
which in due course will require another future interpretant, and so on indefinitely until
the  Final  Opinion  is  reached.  This  process  is  described  as  the  growth  of  concrete
reasonableness.  This  dimension  of  the  normative  ideal  cannot  be  contracted  in  any
individual; but more than that, it leads toward a reality unaffected by human perversity.
Similarly, in the line of the divisions of the Reactional Third one can relate the normative
The Origin and Growth of Peirce’s Ethics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VI-2 | 2014
15
ideal to the element of duality (ethics), for the growth of concrete reasonableness takes
place in cognition through the exercise of self-control, or conscious inhibition; and it will
usually  fall  into  a  catena,  which discloses  two opposing ways  of  thinking:  right  and
wrong. And by picturing the conception of the normative ideal in the unitary line of the
Qualitative  Third  one  will  sense  an  attractive  instigation  of  thought  (esthetics).28
Moreover, the hierarchy of the normative sciences and the fundamental place of esthetics
can now be understood in terms of the prescindibility of the categories; and esthetics can
be appreciated as a form of Qualitative Thirdness.
Thus, when Peirce affirmed that the central problem of the normative sciences comes
down to a question of esthetics, he did not commit himself to some kind of hedonism,
emotivism, or subjectivism, since he did not reduce the summum bonum to a mere feeling
–  otherwise,  the  normative  interpretant  would  lack  objectivity  and  Peirce  would
subscribe to some kind of ethical nominalism.
 
4. Conclusion
58 Studies  about  Peirce’s  normative  thinking  have  either  interpreted  his  contradictory
positions as an attitude of rejection and sarcasm toward Moral Philosophy, or attempted
to reconcile the inconsistent passages by erroneously taking a synchronic approach, thus
missing the evolutionary character of his thought. Peirce changed his mind many times
in his life, and in relation to many philosophical topics. It is not surprising that he also
changed his mind about the notion of normativity and its place in his philosophy. This
paper  offered  a  distinct,  diachronic  and  categorical  contribution  to  understanding
Peirce’s  normative  thinking.  More  specifically,  this  paper  advanced  a  sub-categorical 
analysis to understand the growth of Peirce’s conceptions of ethics. While a diachronic
approach was necessary to argue against the efforts to resolve the inconsistencies in his
writings, a sub-categorical account was essential to support the view that Peirce moved
from a nominalist to a realist position – not only in Metaphysics, but in Moral Philosophy
too. By connecting Peirce’s conceptions of ethics to his theory of the categories I hope to
have provided a better understanding of the structure of his normative realism.
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NOTES
1. References  in  this  format  are  to  Collected  Papers  of  Charles  Sanders  Peirce,  by  volume  and
paragraph number, followed by the given year of the manuscript. Other references will follow
the same notation: “EP” refers to The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings; “W” refers to
Writings of Charles Sanders Peirce: A Chronological Edition; and “RLT” refers to Reasoning and the Logic
of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898.
2. Richard Robin argued that Peirce was “too old and too feeble” to explore the subject (Robin
1964: 271); and Manley Thompson believed that the development of his thinking about ethics was
“so  slight  as  to  make  any  detailed  consideration  of  his  fragmentary  pronouncements  on  its
problems seem singularly unpromising” (Thompson 1963: 197). Beverley Kent (1987: 220, note 35)
disagreed:  “That  this  was  a  later  development  in  the  evolution  of  Peirce’s  thought  should
enhance its significance rather than detract from it, because it represents his mature view.”
3. See the 2012 collection of essays, The Normative Thought of Charles S. Peirce, edited by de Waal
and Skowronski. For earlier works on the topic, see Bernstein (1965: 86); Anderson 1999; and
Mullin  2007.  For  a  previously  valuable  collection  of  essays,  see  Parret  1989;  and  for  a
comprehensive bibliography, see Parker 2002.
4. Scholars  have  interpreted  the  real  tensions  in  Peirce’s  normative  thought  by  conflating
passages from different moments in the development of his philosophy. For instance, extracts
from Peirce’s  1898 lectures are frequently combined with later passages from 1902 onwards,
when he changed his mind. See Cheryl Misak (2004: 174), James Liszka (2012: 78), and de Waal
(2012: 90-1). Due to space limitations I cannot elaborate on more specific examples here.
5. Peirce used the term “esthetics” as a variant of “aesthetics.”
6. James  T.  King  (1969:  113-25)  presents  a  “triadic”  conception  of  ethics  based  on  Peirce’s
category of Thirdness. His work does not explore Peirce’s ethics, but focuses on a criticism of
Moore’s conception of the good. Commenting on King’s paper, Joseph P. DeMarco points out how
Peirce  himself  attempted  to  apply  his  categories  to  ethics,  and  reached  the  conclusion  that
Firstness of Thirdness is the key to ethics (1973: 214-6). In spite of my disagreements on some
points, I share with these authors the recognition of the analytical value of Peirce’s categories to
his ethical theory. My goal is to advance a sub-categorical analysis to understand the growth of
Peirce’s ethics.
7. I note that in 1855 Peirce read Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters (W 1: 2, 1855); and that in 1857 he
wrote a  brief  commentary on Schiller’s  definition of  beauty and its  relation to morality  and
knowledge (W 1: 10-12, 1857). Another interesting point, noticed by Joseph Esposito (1981: 343), is
that Peirce’s early speculations on the categories appear to have been “inspired by Schiller’s
drive to reconcile sensation and thought, value and fact.”
8. See Houser’s “Introduction,” in (W5: xxiii,  1993). Peirce’s 1901 paper, “The Century’s Great
Men.
of Science,” was related to this investigation (CP 7.256-66, 1900).
9. Fish (1986: 395).
10. Just for the record, 1883 was the year Peirce divorced his first wife Melusina and remarried
(six days later) the mysterious Juliette, sailing to Europe three days afterwards; the year he was
having personal  problems at  the Johns Hopkins,  unsatisfied with his  part-time position as  a
lecturer in logic; the year he attempted to buy back some of the books of his library, which had
been sold three years before for the amount of $ 550.00 to the Johns Hopkins; the year a serious
dispute broke out concerning an alleged act of plagiarism of his Logic of Relatives committed by
Professor Sylvester; and also the year John Dewey dropped out from his Logic course, because it
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was “too mathematical.” For a complete account of Peirce’s life and career during the years of
1879-84, see Houser’s “Introduction,” in W4: xix-lxx.
11. Esposito (1981: 344) mentions that at some point near the end of the 1850s Peirce called his
approach to metaphysics, “with great caution, the practical approach” (MS 920.5). And he adds
the following: “I think here that Peirce, hardly in his twenties, had the brilliant insight that all
consciousness, expression, and even creation are intentional in their very nature.”
12. These manuscripts have not been published yet. I expected to find in these writings some
answers to the questions I raise here; Thompson, however, anticipates that “the discussion does
not seem to contribute anything which has not already been remarked” (1963: 198).
13. I have reached this hypothesis independently by reading Lane’s work (2007); later I found this
idea in Kent (1987: 194). Fisch (1986: 228) claims that toward 1899 Peirce recognized the reality of
Firsts. It is beyond the limits of this essay to consider the complexities of Peirce’s notion of real
possibilities.  However,  an interesting question, which bears directly on my topic,  is  how real
possibilities relate to the categories (Debrock 2001: 39-57).
14. Perhaps I should add that “conservatism” is also a quite ambiguous word – not to mention
the  fact  that  Peirce  himself  indiscriminately  switched  references  between  “conservative
sentimentalism”  and  “sentimental  conservatism.”  Roughly,  “conservatism”  has  at  least  two
senses:  it  can mean the tendency not to separate oneself  from the past,  history,  community,
institutions; but it has also been associated to individualistic political views that support minimal
and liberal conceptions of State authority and free market economy. Peirce’s notion of continuity
was certainly conservative in the first sense, but he was clearly not a conservative in the second
sense (see W 8: 192, 1892).
15. Peirce wanted to talk about logic, whereas James called for a more “popular plan,” arguing
that among his students there were “only three man who could possibly follow” the graphs.
James, who had arranged the lectures for Peirce, asked him to “be a good boy” and modify his
initial proposal (Apud, Ketner & Putnam 1992: 25).
16. In  his  seminal  work on the theme of  ideals  in  Peirce’s  philosophy,  Vincent  Potter  (1997
[1967]: 32) writes that Peirce regarded Pure Ethics as the study of what makes “right right and
wrong wrong.” Richard Robin identifies Peirce’s definition as a distinct usage of the concept,
which underlines not the valuation of concrete actions but the inquiry into the conditions for the
satisfaction of human purpose: “the ‘ought’ is hypothetical” (Robin, 1964: 227).
17. A clear introduction to Metaethics can be found in Miller 2003.
18. I thank the anonymous reviewer of EJPAP for calling my attention to this point.
19. I am restating Peirce’s considerations about the degrees of separability of ideas (EP 1: 2-3,
1898).
20. Recall that in 1896-98 Peirce had excluded ethics from the branch of philosophy based on the
fact that the idea of self-control would block the way of inquiry.
21. Krolikowski (1964: 267) relates the infinite process of evolution with the continuing character
of self-control as something that can be endlessly exercised.
22. One might say that these both notions – “percept” and “esthetical goodness” – have also a
component of Secondness. They might be related to a Second because they seem to call for a
separate other or being on which to work its quality. It seems a plausible conclusion, indeed. The
“perceptual judgment” is indeed a Third, and therefore partakes of a Second – as I will explain in
the next section. But one could argue that this cannot be true in relation the idea of a “percept.”
In view of Peirce’s final and extreme form of scholastic realism, the reality of a genuine quality
does not depend on any concrete, actual realization. Peirce rejects the contraction of Firsts to
existent Seconds. This can be illustrated by his second formulation of the Diamond example, in
which its “hardness” or “resistance to pressure” is determined not on the basis of any actual
experiment, but on the basis of a possible experiment in an ideal world (CP 8.208, c.1905). For a
discussion, see Boler (1963: 142ff.).
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23. For more on the topic, compare: Vaught (1986: 311-26); and Hausman (1988: 265-78).
24. I trust this citation to Beverley Kent’s article, “Peirce’s Esthetics: A New Look” (1976).
25. Peirce  uses  the  noun “prescission”  to  refer  to  the  verb  “to  prescind,”  which  means  “to
abstract from” or to “dissect in hypothesis,” as opposed to the word “precision,” which means
“an expression of determination” (CP 5.449, 1905).
26. See Kent (1987: 157) claiming that “such an ideal succeeds in incorporating all three of the
Peircean categories.”
27. Cf. CP 5.535, 1905.
28. See Peirce 2.34, 1902; 1.615, 1903.
ABSTRACTS
The purpose of this paper is to offer a distinct contribution to recent attempts to understand
Peirce’s normative thinking. Scholars have interpreted the real tensions in Peirce’s normative
thought by conflating passages from different moments in the development of his philosophy.
Extracts from Peirce’s famous 1898 lectures (when he dismissed ethics as useless) are frequently
combined  with  later  passages  from  1902  onwards,  when  he  changed  his  mind.  This  paper
proceeds by tracing the growth of Peirce’s thinking about ethics and correlating his conflicting
positions with his theory of the categories. The approach offered here is diachronic. A diachronic
approach is necessary to correct some efforts to resolve the inconsistencies in Peirce’s moral
theory. Also, a categorical account is understood as essential to perceive the inner coherence of
his moral philosophy and to support the view that Peirce moved from a nominalist to a realist
position in ethics. By connecting Peirce’s conceptions of ethics to his theory of the categories I
hope to have provided a better understanding of the structure of his normative realism.
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